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But is it a human rights violation? To answer this, we need to know whether there are human rights to basic socioeconomic goods. Some philosophers think there are not, because such rights are not 'claimable'. I'll focus on this claimability problem. In general, a right is claimable just in case there is one (or more) specific agent with a duty, owed to the claimant, to see to it that the full content of the right is realised. The agent(s) wrongs the claimant if the agent(s) does not do this. Contents of rights might be things like 'the agent meets the claimant at the promised time' or 'the agents do not physically abuse the claimant'.
I'll assume that human rights have two further conditions on their claimability. First, the agent(s) owe the performance independently of specific institutional arrangements. This is arguably necessary for rights to be genuinely human rights: rights borne simply in virtue of being a human, in a world with at least one moral agent. And, by most accounts, this condition is necessary for a 'naturalistic' or 'practice-independent' conception of human rights, as opposed to a 'political' or 'practice-dependent' one. Roughly, the former takes its cue from moral theory, while the latter takes its cue from human rights practice since 1945.
Some think the claimability problem mandates a shift to a political conception (Tomalty 2014) . Others advocate alternative naturalistic conceptions, on which claimability is not an existence condition of a right (Tasioulas 2007; Tasioulas 2010) . I want to see if we can salvage naturalistic, claimable human rights to socioeconomic goods.
The second human-rights-specific claimability condition derives from the importance of human rights' contents. This importance implies that the rights should be enforceable.
Enforceability denotes two things. First, if your human right has been violated, you (or your representative) are permitted to extract redress, compensation, and perhaps punishment.
Second, if your human right is about to be violated, you (or your representative) are permitted to impose costs on the would-be violator to prevent this. The importance of the contents of 3 human rights implies that their claimability should have actionable teeth. Enforceability gets us this.
Combining these three conditions, I'll assume the claimability of a socioeconomic good as a human right entails three things:
(i) each human is owed the socioeconomic good from one or more agents, so the agent(s) wrong that human if the agent(s) does not see to it that the human has the Why are socioeconomic goods thought to be unclaimable in this sense? Because 'ought' implies 'can'. In light of (i), notice that no actual moral agent, whether individual or collective, can provide any socioeconomic good to all vulnerable humans. So, assuming 'ought' implies 'can,' no agent owes any socioeconomic good to every human.
Instead, perhaps each agent owes these goods to some subset of people (say, the agent's family or co-citizens). Such rights would not meet any of the three conditions: these conditions refer to each human, and not all humans are guaranteed to have family or cocitizens (or other special relationship-holders) who can give them the goods. So this is no way to produce human rights. Or perhaps each agent enjoys some discretion over how to discharge whatever duties they have with regard to socioeconomic goods. Each agent might choose to provide the goods to some subset of vulnerable humans who the agent picks, or each agent might choose to give some tiny amount of each good to every vulnerable human. 4 On this possibility, no agent wrongs any vulnerable human if the agent chooses to discharge her duty in a way that doesn't provide adequate (say) food for that human, and threat or coercion cannot be used by any human to extract adequate food from any agent. At least, that's true until some agent is somehow 'picked out' by specific institutional arrangements as owing that vulnerable human adequate food. But that would violate condition (ii). In other words, as long as (i) and (ii) are both required for claimability, socioeconomic goods are not claimable as human rights (Gilabert 2009: 659; Hope 2014: 8; O'Neill 1996: 330-2; O'Neill 2005: 431-2) .
One might think claimability is also problematic for civil-political human rights. 1 There is dispute about the moral significance of the distinction between socioeconomic and civil-political human rights (Lichtenberg 2004; Shue 1996: ch. 2 ; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2015). In general, though, civil-political rights relate to non-interference and to procedural recognition, while socioeconomic rights relate to goods and services. There are two reasons why I focus on socioeconomic rights.
The first is that the contents of some civil-political rights-including a fair trial and political participation-arguably depend on specific institutions (in particular, modern states) (Beitz 2003) . If specific institutional arrangements are smuggled into the very contents of human rights, then we can use these arrangements to 'pair up' right-holders with dutybearers, including assigning 'back-up' duty-bearers in case the primary duty-bearers renege (as Nickel (1993: 82-3; does). The claimability problem is thus easily 'solved'-but at the expense of condition (ii). Only a political conception of these human rights would be possible.
Some might disagree, and claim that civil-political rights are fundamentally institution-independent. (Griffin (2008: 50) suggests this; Tasioulas (2012: 31-6 ) disputes it.) 1 I thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion, and Hillel Steiner for discussion of it.
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For example, maybe 'political participation' means not 'a vote in free and fair elections', but more broadly 'having input into decisions about social arrangements'. The former is simply a contextually-appropriate specification of the latter. If this is correct, then condition (ii) is not violated by the rights' contents and the claimability problem will arise for these rights.
However, I lack space to defend such a broad conception of these political rights, so will put their claimability to one side. By contrast, having 'adequate food' or 'adequate education' doesn't require specific institutional arrangements.
The second reason for focusing on socioeconomic rights is that other civil-political rights-such as the right against torture or to free speech-in the first instance require only non-interference. This poses no problems for claimability, since non-interference can be claimed against each agent at all times. Now, if some agent does interfere or is about to interfere, then the right-holder might have a second-instance claim that third parties intervene to protect the right-holder-that is, a claim for protection, additional to the right-holder's permission to protect herself that was posited in condition (iii).
2 These second-instance protection claims face the claimability problem: protection is expensive, so cannot be given to all humans by any one agent. But this does not undermine the first-instance claimability of non-interference rights: the right against interference is still claimable by each human against each who can interfere, even if it may not be claimable against those who can protect against interference. Socioeconomic human rights, however, seem not to be claimable against anyone at all, not even in the first instance, since they require positive action in the first instance (in a world without overabundance) (O'Neill 2000: 105) . Thus, the claimability problem looms 2 Waldron (1993: 212-3) and Shue (1996) argue there is such a claim; Locke implies not (1689, essay 2, ch. 2), though Steiner (2006) argues such claims are at least consistent with Lockean self-ownership.
6 larger for socioeconomic rights, even if it also looms for the (perhaps non-existent) protection aspect of non-interference rights.
All that said, it remains possible that there are civil-political rights that neither require particular institutions, nor demand only non-interference in the first instance. If so, all the arguments of this paper apply to those civil-political rights, though I will not discuss them explicitly.
The argument begins in §II by considering several recent attempts to solve the claimability problem. Perhaps coercive institutions owe socioeconomic goods to all persons they coerce (Pogge 2002) . Or perhaps humanity has a group-level duty to provide socioeconomic goods for all (Ashford 2006; Nussbaum 2004; Waldron 1993; Wringe 2005) .
Or perhaps what is claimable is that each agent considers socioeconomic human rights in their deliberations (Sen 2004; Gilabert 2009 ). I argue that none of these succeed in vindicating a claimable human right to socioeconomic goods. But the last suggestion gives us the seeds of a claimable human right that is grounded in the value of socioeconomic goods.
The idea is that each human-in virtue of being human-bears claimable rights (one right for each pairing of a socioeconomic good and an agent) that each agent deliberates equitably about how to respect, protect, and promote the socioeconomic good, and acts accordingly. I call these 'socioeconomic-consideration human rights'.
The rest of the article gives precision to this idea. §III details a proposed structure for socioeconomic-consideration human rights and their correlative duties. Importantly, the proposed structure aims at neutrality between competing ways of decorating the structure with substantive value theories. This neutrality will allow us to retain the structure, and so retain socioeconomic-consideration human rights, regardless of how substantive debates are resolved. §IV argues that socioeconomic-consideration human rights are satisfactorily There is a constraint on this solution: the institutions must be agents. After all, the duties correlative to socioeconomic human rights are duties to see to it that something obtains. If 'seeing to it that X' is an action (which it seems to be), then it can be performed only by an agent. As Holly Lawford-Smith puts it, '[a]ttributing obligations to [non-agent] groups makes those obligation statements impotent: it requires action from something that cannot act'. (Lawford-Smith 2015: 226) Non-agent groups cannot act for one or both of two 8 reasons: first, they cannot will, intend, or try, since they lack the necessary group-level reasoning apparatus; and second, in most contexts, there is an insufficiently high likelihood of the non-agent group bringing about the end that the 'action' would achieve, even if each individual in the non-agent group were to try to bring about that end (Collins 2013; LawfordSmith 2015) . This is why the three conditions for claimability refer to 'agents,' not simply 'duty-bearers'.
So the relevant institutions must be agents. This is not damning: on popular views of group agency, any group with a group-level rational decision-making procedure counts as an agent (French 1979; List & Pettit 2011 (Pogge 1992; Kuper 2000; Cabrera 2004 ). These latter duties cannot be borne by the institutions itself since, ex hypeothesi, no institution exists that is capable of such self-reform.
The 'institution' solution cannot generate the duties that intuitively exist in cases of groupagent break-down.
On the other hand, suppose Gazans' socioeconomic human rights are claimable against each of Hamas, Israel, and Egypt. Suppose, more generally, that one's socioeconomic human rights are claimable against agents including, but not limited to, one's dominant social institution. We then run straight back into the claimability problem: without a 'pairing up' of agents and claimants, imposed by specific institutional arrangements, no agent owes any particular Gazan any socioeconomic good. This is because, without specific institutional arrangements, it is unclear why each agent doesn't also owe the goods to every other human-but then that would violate ''ought' implies 'can''.
The problem here is not just that it's difficult for the numerous duty-bearing agents to coordinate. The problem is that each agent's duty cannot literally be a duty to ensure humans have adequate socioeconomic goods, because no agent can do this on their own (at least in contexts like Gaza). Making this happen takes coordination. But agents cannot coordinate unilaterally. So, assuming no agent can force the others to coordinate (thereby ensuring, unilaterally, that all humans get the goods), no agent owes the humans the goods. Perhaps each agent owes each human some help in getting the goods, or should try to coordinate with other agents to secure the goods-in fact, §III will suggest something like this. But this is not a duty to ensure the human has the goods (as distinct from trying to secure the goods or attempting to coordinate), since no agent can do that on their own. But if no agent has a duty to see to it that the human has the goods, then there can be no right to the goods: this follows from condition (i) for claimability.
II.B Claimable against a Non-agent Group
If we could resist the idea that each duty is held by an agent, then socioeconomic human rights could be claimable against a non-agent group, as a singular entity. Several philosophers have made this move. Elizabeth Ashford suggests that in some cases 'we can say that a group of agents is responsible for a large number of human rights violations, but we Above, I gave two reasons why we should resisting attributing duties to non-agents.
These reasons apply to 'humanity', 'the affluent', 'upholders of coercive social institutions', and 'the international community': these groups cannot act, since they lack group-level rational decision-making procedures, and they are unreliable. But even putting these reasons to one side, we should still resist this solution. This is because it doesn't satisfactorily live up to conditions (i) and (iii) for claimability.
On (i), it is often inaccurate to say 'humanity' or 'the affluent' wrongs a person if that person doesn't enjoy socioeconomic goods. To see this, suppose some people play their part-or even take up others' slack-in the alleged collective obligation. But, suppose, there are enough slackers that not all humans enjoy socioeconomic goods. It would then be 11 incorrect to paint the compliers-let alone the slack-takers-with the 'wronger' brush. The wronging is more specific: it's performed by only some people in the collective, and should be acknowledged as such. But if we are going to individualise wronging, then it seems bizarre not to individualise the duties to which the wronging relates.
On (iii), it is unclear what kind of force or coercion could possibly be used against 'humanity' or 'the affluent'. On the one hand, if the coercion must be applied to all people in the group, then enforcement of socioeconomic human rights becomes materially impossible for most humans (and their representatives). On the other hand, if the coercion may be applied to only a subset of group, then coercion is possible-but we then need some method of choosing which subset is to be coerced. This requires considering the attributes of the individual agents in the group, and so ignoring the idea that the duty belongs to the group itself. Again, if we individualise coercion, we should individualise the duties to which the coercion relates.
Still, perhaps the virtues of this solution outweigh the costs. One alleged virtue is explanatory power. Suppose you and I could save a drowning toddler, if only we coordinated.
Wringe would argue that your duty to take individual steps towards coordinating with me can be explained only with reference to a group-level duty to save the toddler; thus, we should posit group-level duties borne by the non-agent group composed of you and me (2005, 202-3; forthcoming). However, the individuals' duties-to-take-steps-towards-coordinating can be explained just as well with reference to the fact that, if each of us takes individual steps towards coordination, then there is a sufficiently high likelihood that the other will do likewise and that a highly valuable outcome (the toddler's being saved) will be realised. An explanation of the individual duties can be found simply in the value of the individual actions, which (in this example) derive from the value of the state of affairs each individual action will probably realise. There's no explanatory need for group-level duties of a nonagent group.
In sum, to view a non-agent group as the bearer of duties to fulfil human rights is to misfire on the issues of action, reliability, wrongdoing, enforceability, and explanatory power. So we should also resist viewing individuals' duties as parts of a duty held by a nonagent group. Importantly, though, these points do not apply to group agents. Group agents can act, can act reliably, and many of their actions, duties, and wrongings cannot be reduced to analogous facts about individuals (Pettit 2007; List and Pettit 2011) .
II.C Claimable against Each Agent
A third solution views the duties correlative to socioeconomic human rights as owed to each human by each (individual or group) agent, rather than a group of such agents taken together. Similarly, Pablo Gilabert suggests socioeconomic human rights impose 'a duty of the highest priority for individuals and governments to identify ways to protect certain important interests through (a) specific rights and entitlements, but also, when these are insufficient or 13 not presently feasible, through (b) urgent goals of institution-building'. (Gilabert 2009: 673) Elsewhere A second problem is that the duties are 'loosely specified' (Sen 2004: 341) or contain 'latitude' (Gilabert 2010: 399) . This suggests each agent has discretion about which actions result from their consideration or identification of means. The claimability problem has then 5 Sen and Gilabert are not alone, though (as far as I am aware) they elaborate the most. and who must act on specific occasions to make that treatment available (the addressees)'
(1987: 17, emphasis added).
The tentative upshot of §II, then, is that human rights to socioeconomic goods are not claimable. 6 That said, Sen's and Gilabert's proposals contain the seeds of a theoretically sound and morally satisfying solution to the claimability problem. There are two improvements to be made. First, we should admit that duties to give reasonable consideration correlate with rights to receive reasonable consideration, not rights to socioeconomic goods.
Call these 'socioeconomic-consideration human rights'. This makes the solution theoretically
sound. Second, we should specify 'reasonable consideration' so as to remove the discretion, as Sen and Gilabert do not. This makes the solution morally satisfying. The aim of the next section is to complete the second of these tasks.
III. Specifying the Duties

III.A The General Proposal
One might think it impossible to be more specific than Sen or Gilabert: 'there is no obvious index defining how much any person should justifiably sacrifice, in terms of her own distinct 6 There are proposals I haven't discussed, e.g. Stemplowska's (2009) and Nickel's (1993: 82-3; . In my view, Gilabert (2009: 672) successfully criticises the "sequential approach,"
which Nickel endorses, for not being independent of specific institutional arrangements.
Stemplowska's proposed duties are not independent of particular acts of claiming. good-furthering or good-securing measure she should take for the claimant, the duty is completed with (A) and (B).)
A different way of glossing it is this. Duties generated by the imperative that humans have socioeconomic goods are duties ultimately to take some socioeconomic measure, whether action or omission. 'Socioeconomic measures' are measures an agent reasonably believes will further or secure the provision of some socioeconomic good. So agent S's deliberation is aimed at figuring out which socioeconomic measure S should take, for a particular socioeconomic good. Call the socioeconomic measure that S should take, vis-a-vis a particular good, 'M'. Part (A) of S's duty is to form a belief, in an epistemically reasonable way, about which measure is M. If S doesn't undertake epistemically reasonable deliberation, she violates all humans' socioeconomic-consideration human rights. Part (B) of S's duty is to ensure no claimant receives morally inequitable consideration in that belief formation. S violates the socioeconomic-consideration human rights of anyone who receives inequitable consideration in her belief-formation. Part (B) allows S to use heuristics or other cognitive shortcuts: she need not consider each and every claimant by name. Such heuristics, one might think, do not treat each agent equitably. But, precisely because the heuristics don't make reference to any particular claimants, they also don't treat any claimant inequitably. This is why the double-negative in part (B) matters. Part (C) of S's duty is to actually take measure M. If she doesn't take measure M, she violates the human rights of those whose provision of socioeconomic goods M would have helped to further or secure.
It is possible that, for some agent, there is no measure M. Thus the bracketed phrase in (C) arises. This is because, in forming her epistemically reasonable and morally notinequitable belief (i.e. discharging parts (A) and (B) of the duty), S should abide by four conditions, which the next subsection lays out. It's possible that there is no measure with regard to which she can meet every condition. In this case, S does her duty to all humans visa-vis that socioeconomic good just by doing the reasonable and not-inequitable deliberation and finding that there's no socioeconomic measure she should take for that particular good.
But I will proceed on the assumption that, for each agent, there is some measure she should take to further each socioeconomic good. The next step is to do better than Sen, by making these duties non-discretionary.
III.B Four Steps in Deliberation
The task now is to make parts (A) and (B) of these duties non-discretionary, and so the rights claimable. I want to do this without taking a stand on substantive disputes about the limits of morality's demandingness, the relative importance of various human rights, the extent to which considerations such as community or contribution-to-harm affect our duties, and so on.
One aim in this sub-section is to demonstrate that these duties can be action-guiding even in the face of moral uncertainty. A second aim is to demonstrate that we will be able to retain non-discretionary socioeconomic-consideration duties-and the claimable human rights with which they correlate-regardless of how philosophers end up settling substantive moral disputes. A third aim is to give an example of how these duties might be discharged for an actual agent. Choose better over worse; (4) Randomise when unsure. Let me say a little to motivate and specify these.
First, consider that the point of the duty is to respond to the imperative that humans should have reliable access to a socioeconomic good. It's not to respond to some other moral imperative. So, plausibly, a necessary first condition for measure M is:
(1) For all agent S reasonably believes, M will bring some human(s) closer to having reliable access to the socioeconomic good.
A full discussion of 'reasonable belief' is beyond my scope here. But I do not assume that these epistemic duties are all-demanding. The requirement is for a reasonable belief, not an unassailable one. For example, suppose one socioeconomic good is education. Your beliefs about which measures will further education will probably be reasonable if you simply keep up with reliable new outlets, and periodically discuss your views with reflective friends.
You don't violate others' human rights to education-consideration only if you take a measure that you reasonably believe will further education (assuming there is such a measure that also satisfies the other three slogans). Other actions might be good, but they wouldn't 19 respond to that specific right. For example, you might reasonably believe you could further education by voting for an education-focused political party, or volunteering at an adult education programme, or donating money to a charity that cures children's intestinal worms.
If so, these measures (and measures made up of the set or a sub-set of them) would meet condition (1).
A more precise version of slogan (2) is:
(2) S has a reasonable belief that S's taking M would not be wrong.
Some measures that pass slogan (1) might fail slogan (2). Suppose you reasonably believe that the only education-furthering political party on your ballot card will focus on elite private schooling. This will help secure adequate education for rich children, so will pass slogan (1). However (you reasonably believe), the party will sharply cut public spending, which will strongly exacerbate poverty. You reasonably believe that it is wrong to contribute to, or symbolically indicate support of, the exacerbation of poverty. Voting for the educationfurthering party fails slogan (2).
When is a measure wrong? Answering this requires resolving the substantive moral disagreements, on which my framework is neutral. Perhaps only some violations-violations of 'justice', or of other human rights, say-can render a socioeconomic measure wrong.
Perhaps an education measure would be wrong only if it required you to steal, or kill a person, or commit some other grave act. Or perhaps any measure that required you to have 'one thought too many' would be wrong (e.g. an education-furthering measure that required you to consider not favouring your child's education over other children's (Williams 1981, 18) Again, justice-and rights-violations might sharply diminish a measure's value, as might thoughts or actions that lack integrity. In addition, agent-relativity might come in here, in that cost-to-you might weigh more heavily in value assessments than cost-to-others. For example, if you're really not a people-person, then the education-furthering measure of volunteering at an adult education programme might have its value sharply diminished, compared to a similar measure for other agents-and, the measure might be more disvalued because this cost is a cost to you, rather than a similarly high cost to another person (Scheffler 1982) .
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Even after acknowledging these possible specifications of slogan (3), the slogan will remain controversial. This is because it assumes we can talk of measures having 'more' or 'less' expected value than one another. But this might not always be so, which leads us to slogan (4). Suppose you are weighing up two education-furthering measures. On one, you tutor disadvantaged children, with the opportunity cost of you having time to write a great novel. On the other, you send money to a child deworming charity, with the opportunity cost of you being able to buy some paints, which you would have used to paint a great painting.
(Assume painting takes less time than writing.) Condition (3) might then be true of both measures. This might straightforwardly be because the measures are top-equal. But it might be because the novel and the painting are (epistemically or metaphysically) incommensurable (Raz 1986, ch. 13) . How, then, should you choose? Ex hypothesi, neither measure is better than the other (if we're dealing with equality or metaphysical incommensurability), or is known to be better than the other (if we're dealing with epistemic incommensurability). So, if you were to exercise discretion-choosing on the basis of a whim or trivial preference-then you would disregard the value of the unchosen measure.
Given this, your obligation is to use a randomiser-a metaphorical equally-weighted dice with as many sides as there are top-ranked measures. In cases where it is indeterminate which measure is top-ranked, or where there is a tie, the use of a randomiser is the second stage of deliberation. It isn't external to your deliberative procedure, but rather the proper application of it in such cases. This is important: it removes your discretion or latitude entirely, so that there is one education-furthering measure, not chosen by you, that you owe to those whose education it furthers, that you wrong them by not performing, and that you may be threatened or coerced into performing-whether it's the tutoring or giving to the deworming charity. So we have the precise version of slogan (4) In sum, (1)- (4) are the deliberative means to discharging parts (A) and (B) of your socioeconomic consideration duties, which correlate to socioeconomic human rights. These conditions tell you which measure is M. Part (C) of your duty is to take M.
Two further points. First, M will very often involve taking individual steps towards coordinating with others to reform powerful collective agents, as implied in §II. The education example neglected this purely for exegetical simplicity. Second, while there may be value in reconsidering the four slogans periodically (and if so, this will be included in M), any measure that incorporated constant reconsideration would likely fail at slogan (3), since it would be too costly to the agent.
This gives determinate content to socioeconomic-consideration human rights, that is, rights that each agent deliberates equitably about how to respect, protect, and promote the socioeconomic good, and acts accordingly. And these rights are claimable:
For each socioeconomic good: 
IV. Objections and Clarifications
IV.A Claimability
These rights might seem unsatisfactorily claimable: I might never know if you have done your duty with regard to me, so never know that I am wronged, or what measure you owed, or that I might have used threats to extract it from you. However, notice that the same is true of civil-political rights-even rights to mere non-interference. Consider the right against arbitrary interference with one's privacy. If a detective snoops around my home without good reason, they've violated my human rights. But neither I, nor anyone else, might ever know about it. We do not think this makes the duty non-owed, makes me non-wronged, or leaves me unwarranted in demanding redress for the snooping, if I find out. This problem will probably arise more often for socioeconomic-consideration human rights than for the civil- A separate claimability-related problem is that these rights might seem not to meet condition (iii): surely it's impermissible to threaten someone into including you in their deliberations about socioeconomic measures. To be sure, enforcing socioeconomicconsideration duties through law would potentially mean impermissibly invading individuals' private lives. The results would be unduly complex, costly, and inefficacious, and would potentially result in an insidious culture of blame and accusation against duty-bearers (O'Neill 2005: 436-9). However, it is never permissible to use disproportionate threats to enforce rights-socioeconomic or civil-political, human or special. I will not take a stand on which threats are proportionate for enforcing socioeconomic consideration human rights. If
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John Stuart Mill is correct that negative public opinion and being berated by one's own conscious are a means of punishment, and if, therefore, the threat of these things is a form of coercion, then these might be appropriate means by which to coerce people into discharging these duties (Mill 1993 (Mill [1861 : 50).
One A final claimability-related objection is that persons who lack adequate socioeconomic goods are not in a position to enforce this right, or to discharge its correlative duties. They are too busy trying to stay alive. It is a cruel joke to assert that people without adequate socioeconomic goods are permitted to enforce my duty to give them not-inequitable consideration. It's an even crueller joke to suggest they have a duty to reciprocate, by giving me not-inequitable consideration. Instead, socioeconomic goods are a precondition for someone's bearing the claims and duties of human rights, which can only properly include civil-political rights (since these do not concern the material goods necessary for right-and duty-bearing).
9
There are three options here, between which I'm neutral. The first asserts that humans can be claimers without being claimees. I suspect this would not satisfy the objector, since the objection presupposes that moral agency is necessary for making claims. The second agrees that some humans lack the requisites for making claims, and asserts that some agents 9 Conversation with Katrin Flikschuh inspired this objection.
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(e.g. states) have (non-claimable, non-socioeconomic-consideration) duties to be the trustees of these persons, making claims on their behalf (Darwall 2006: 95; Scanlon 1998: 185-6 ).
The second is to deny that socioeconomic goods are necessary for being a claimee or claimer.
So those lacking such goods can both claim the duty and have it claimed of them. That said, the duty even to undertake the deliberation is only pro tanto-it can be overridden or outweighed by other moral and non-moral considerations. So those lacking adequate socioeconomic goods might not have an all-things-considered duty to undertake the deliberation.
IV.B Practicality
There are three practicality-related objections. The first arises from ongoing philosophical debates: about morality's demandingness; about what determines rights' importance; about the role of community and contribution in constraining our duties to humans worldwide; and so on. The objection is that this lack of consensus makes it impossible to determine whether I have discharged my socioeconomic-consideration duties, which means these duties cannot be what correlate to socioeconomic-consideration human rights. So, this objection contains two steps: from debates to impracticability, and from impracticability to inaccuracy.
On the first step: all duties correlative to human rights have ongoing debates about their constraints and content. There are debates about the right to life, for example, where this is understood as implying simply a duty not to kill. It's unclear whether killing is permitted if not intended but merely foreseen, whether there's a difference between killing and letting die, how to define the 'persons' bearing this right (foetuses, for example), whether this right is ever subject to aggregation (may I kill one to save fifty thousand?), and, if aggregation is
permitted, in what circumstances (may I kill one to save five? two?). These debates make it tricky to know whether I have discharged the duty correlating to the right to life. Again, the 27 difference here between socioeconomic-consideration duties and duties correlative to other human rights is one of quantity, not quality (Tasioulas 2007: 90) .
A final point on the first step in this objection: it is often possible to judge that an agent is not fulfilling their socioeconomic-consideration duties. Anyone for whom it doesn't even cross their mind that they should consider doing something to help others enjoy socioeconomic goods is clearly reneging on this duty. There are many individual and collective agents like this. The fact that there are some blurry cases (is the affluent individual who donates £20 a month to effective charities discharging the duty-or would truly reasonable deliberation have led her to give £50?) does not undermine the practicality of assessing violations of socioeconomic-consideration human rights in all cases. We can make many certain judgments that people are not doing their duty, and some certain judgments that people are doing their duty, even if there are many borderline cases.
The second step in this objection-the move from impracticality of the duty to the inaccuracy of the duty-is much less potent. The fact that there is a lack of philosophical consensus on an issue (say, the extent of morality's demandingness) does not imply that there is no fact of the matter about that issue. This is true on both constructivist and realist conceptions of moral truth.
A second practicality-based objection re-launches the claimability problem, deriving from ''ought' implies 'can''. The idea is that-even if the philosophical debates were resolved-socioeconomic-consideration duties would be beyond the capacities of human on a view with discretion, if I am approached by someone lacking socioeconomic goods, then I may simply say that I didn't pick them. I had discretion, and I exercised it. But 'picking' doesn't reflect respect for the non-picked. Consideration does-even if that consideration was performed under physical limitations, so that some of the result was random.
A final objection asks how socioeconomic-consideration duties relate to all-thingsconsidered moral reasoning. It asks whether parts (A), (B), and (C) of socioeconomicconsideration duties-and slogans (1)-(4) that allow agents to ensure parts (A) and (B) are discharged-are just aspects of what we morally ought to do all the time, all things considered, when we're deciding what we morally ought to do in general. Perhaps the parts and slogans I've laid out apply to many-perhaps all-moral decisions, and so don't tell us anything in particular about socioeconomic goods or their associated human rights.
I'm not sure why such continuity is a bad thing. The more deeply we can embed socioeconomic human rights (and civil-political rights, for that matter) into the everyday moral deliberation of all agents-individual and collective-the less human rights are viewed as something only the most powerful of agents need to consider in the most dire of circumstances. Instead, human rights become a problem for all agents to solve, all the time.
My proposal embeds socioeconomic human rights into the rest of moral deliberation and action. This includes deliberation about civil-political human rights, the violation of which might be a wrong-making feature of socioeconomic measures. Such continuity between types 30 of human rights, and between human rights and the rest of morality, seems like something to be celebrated, not resisted.
Questions remain. I have not demonstrated that my four proposed slogans for socioeconomic-consideration constitute the best structure within which to house socioeconomic-consideration human rights and their correlative duties. If other structures would work, then so much the better for socioeconomic-consideration human rights. There are also questions about which goods are 'socioeconomic'; how we differentiate amongst socioeconomic goods (and, therefore, amongst socioeconomic-consideration human rights); why some socioeconomic goods are valuable enough to generate socioeconomicconsideration duties; whether international intervention is justified if a state does not discharge its socioeconomic-consideration duties; how socioeconomic-consideration human rights stack up against other human rights; and so on. In short, I have not given a full positive case for the existence of socioeconomic-consideration human rights. I have merely saved them from the claimability objection, which, I have argued, is fatal to other construals of socioeconomic human rights. If the claimability objection has been answered, then we will be some way-but only some way-towards justifying and understanding socioeconomicconsideration human rights, that is, human rights that each agent deliberates equitably about how to respect, protect, and promote the socioeconomic good, and acts accordingly. thank audiences at the Universities of Bristol, Manchester, Leeds, and Sheffield.
